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best interests and insults the equity of our legal structure. The
integrity of the judiciary and the welfare of the child mandate its
elimination.
ANDREA ANN TIM O
Zoning-Restrictions on Mobile Homes: The Beginning of the
End?
Fifty years after zoning ordinances first underwent judicial exami-
nation' the New Jersey Supreme Court, one of the nation's leading state
forums for zoning adjudication,' in Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth
Township3 upheld the validity of a municipal ordinance that limited the
use of mobile home units within trailer parks to elderly persons. The
Weymouth decision comes just one year after the New Jersey court's
landmark decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel4 striking down exclusionary zoning regulations. Con-
sidered in light of Mount Laurel, the Weymouth result may appear to
limit the extent to which the court is willing to find an impermissible
exclusionary intent or effect in local land use regulations--even when
those regulations expressly restrict residential land use on the basis of
types of occupancy. 5 The decision could thus be misread as being
another in a series of recent decisions6 that in effect give judicial ap-
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see note 22
infra.
2. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING § 6.04, at 119-21 (1972).
3. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). A companion case to Weymouth also
upheld zoning ordinances permitting special residential uses for the elderly. Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
4. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
5. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S.
Ct. 555 (1977), noted in 55 N.C.L. Rnv. 733 (1977) (upholding municipality's refusal
to rezone a 15 acre parcel from single family to multi-family classification, thus pre-
venting construction of a housing complex for low and moderate income tenants); Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance restrict-
ing the use of one-family residences to persons related by blood, adoption or marriage,
or to not more than two unrelated persons); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971),
noted in 50 N.C.L. REv. 369 (1972) (upholding a California constitutional provision
requiring approval by local referendum before low-rent housing projects may be estab-
lished in a community); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), noted il 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976)
(upholding a comprehensive zoning plan designed to control the municipality's growth,
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proval to exclusionary zoning ordinances. The Weymouth opinion,
however, strongly reaffirms the New Jersey court's view that local zon-
ing ordinances must promote the general welfare of an entire region
rather than merely the welfare of the municipality promulgating the
regulations. Ultimately, Weymouth is significant in detailing the
criteria with which the exclusionary impetus or impact of such ordi-
nances might be discerned, criteria that may lead to the invalidation in
New Jersey and elsewhere of zoning restrictions that restrict or prohibit
the residential use of mobile homes.
Weymouth Township's general zoning ordinances, which had
previously permitted trailer camps in one .district of the municipality,8
were amended in 1971 to prohibit generally the use of trailer homes
within the township. The amended ordinances did, however, permit
the establishment of a limited number of trailer parks upon compliance
with specified requirements,9 the most significant of which restricted
occupancy to "elderly persons" or "elderly families,"'10 defined as indi-
viduals or heads of households fifty-two years of age or older." The
Taxpayers Association of Weymouth Township and several of its
members filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the ordinances were enacted
improperly, constituted illegal "spot zoning" and unconstitutionally in-
fringed upon the rights of children. 12  The Superior Court, Law Divi-
sion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.' 3 On appeal, the Superior
Court, Appellate Division, reversed and invalidated the ordinances,
ruling that the municipality's zoning power did not authorize ordinances
restricting land use by the age of occupants' 4 and that the ordinances
in effect limiting the number of newcomers who may reside in the community); cf. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (rejecting a challenge against allegedly exclusionary zon-
ing ordinances for petitioners' lack of standing).
7. Weymouth, N.J., Ordinances 171-1971 (July 7, 1971) & 172-1971 (June 25,
1971); see 71 N.J. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021. The township had adopted its zoning
policy in 1966. Id. at 258, 364 A.2d at 1021.
8. 71 N.J. at 258, 364 A.2d at 1021.
9. Id. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021.
10. As quoted by the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, the crucial
portion of the ordinance provides: "Trailer parks are generally prohibited in the Town-
ship. A special exception to fulfill the needs of senior citizens, as defined by this ordin-
ance, has been made by the township. Occupancy by any persons other than elderly
[persons] or elderly families is hereby prohibited." Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth
Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 379, 311 A.2d 187, 188 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)
(quoting Weymouth, N.J., Ordinance 172-1971 (June 25, 1971)).
11. Id. "Elderly families" is further defined as those in which the youngest spouse
is 45 years of age or older, and in which all children are at least 18 years of age. Id.
12. 71 N.J. at 260, 364 A.2d at 1022.
13. Id.
14. 125 N.J. Super. at 380-81, 311 A.2d at 189.
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were unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinances did not exceed
the municipality's zoning power, 16 did not violate either the due process
or equal protection provisions of the state or federal constitutions,'
1
and did not, on the basis of the facts before it, constitute impermissible
exclusionary zoning.' 8
Although zoning ordinances designed to provide housing for the
elderly have been promulgated by many communities, court tests of
their validity have not provided uniform results.' 9 The Weymouth de-
cision is significant not only in increasing the number of those courts
that have upheld such ordinances, but also in doing so after reviewing
the facts of the case in an unusually thorough manner. This close scru-
tiny is in part required by the New Jersey constitution's equal protection
provisions," and in part by the requirements of the Mount Laurel deci-
sion-itself based on state constitutional grounds.' In contrast, the
standard of review applied to zoning ordinances by most forums con-
tinues to be the test formulated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
15. Id. at 382, 311 A.2d at 189-90; see note 52 and accompanying text infra.
16. 71 N.J. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030.
17. Id. at 287-88, 364 A.2d at 1037; see notes 52 & 71 and accompanying text
infra.
18. See id. at 295-96, 364 A.2d at 1041. The court upheld the lower court's dis-
missal of the unlawful conspiracy and illegal spot zoning challenges originally raised
against the ordinances. Id. at 261, 364 A.2d at 1022.
19. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.44 (2d ed. 1976). Com-
pare Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P.
1965), with Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.R2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, ap-
peal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
20. The equal protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution provide in
part: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and
unalienable rights, among which are those . . . of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property. .. ." N.J. CONsr. art. 1, § 1; "No person shall be denied the enjoyment of
any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil or
military right . . . because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national ori-
gin." Id. § 5. The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that, because of these
provisions, "[W]here an important personal right is affected by governmental ac-
tion, this court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater 'public need'
than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution." Taxpayer's Ass'n
v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 286, 364 A.2d at 1036. For an example of this
demanding review, see Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 331 A.2d 262
(1975), upholding the validity of an ordinance prohibiting canvassing or soliciting with-
out first registering with the chief of police and procuring a permit. In rejecting appel-
lants' equal protection challenge to the ordinance the court observed that "application
of a test based either on mere rationality or strict scrutiny is not called for; rather we
adopt a 'means-focused' standard. This narrows our inquiry to the 'crucial question
[of] whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the dif-
ferential treatment.'" Id. at 370, 331 A.2d at 274.
21. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.
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Co.-a test that accords land use regulations a substantial presumption
of validity when challenged on either federal or state constitutional
grounds.22 New Jersey applied this deferential standard in many of
its earlier zoning cases;23 it was utilized in particular by the New Jersey
Supreme Court to uphold the validity of local zoning ordinances that
in effect banned house trailers from the municipality. The court's ap-
proval of such bans, first set forth in Vickers v. Township Committee,"4
was predicated upon a "broad interpretation" of the general welfare.2"
If any zoning oidinance was "reasonably calculated" to promote the
general welfare,26 as it was thus expansively defined, the ordinance
was, according to the Vickers court, a proper exercise of the muni-
cipality's zoning power as derived from the state. The Vickers court
22. The United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), established that in any judicial test of a zoning ordinance "it must
be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare." Id. at 395. This complaisant standard continues
to be applied without variation in federal courts, as was observed by the Supreme Court
in Arlington Heights when it referred approvingly to "the generous Euclid test, recently
reaffirmed in Belle Terre." 97 S. Ct. at 562. With respect to state law the Euclid Court
had declared: "The question is the same under both [the United States and Ohio] Consti-
tutions. . . : Is the ordinance invalid in that it violates the constitutional protection 'to
the right of property in the appellee by attempted regulations under the guise of the
police power, which are unreasonable and confiscatory?'" 272 U.S. at 386. As a result
the Euclid test, though formulated by a federal court, is applied by most states in zoning
cases, whether a challenge is based on state or federal constitutional grounds. See 1
R. ANDERSON, supra note 19, § 3.14, at 106-07. As noted earlier, however, the equal
protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution have, with respect to zoning and
other cases, required a standard of review somewhat more rigorous than that established
in Euclid. See note 20 supra.
23. See 1 N. WILAMS, supra note 2, § 6.04, at 119.
24. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
233 (1963).
25. Id. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137. Under this interpretation the "general welfare"
is defined in such generalized terms as the "public convenience" or "general prosperity."
Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 28, 118 A.2d 401, 407 (1955) (quoting Schmidt v.
Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 415, 88 A.2d 607, 611 (1952)). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has related this generalized and all-embracive reading of the general wel-
fare to the equally broad and inclusive concept of the public welfare set forth in the
landmark opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954). Under this relatively vague definition court examination of zoning or-
dinances is cursory since this amorphous conception of the general welfare provides a
rationale for almost any zoning provision. See text accompanying notes 30 & 31 infra.
26. 37 N.J. at 247, 181 A.2d at 137.
27. At the time suit was commenced the New Jersey zoning statutes provided in
part:
Any municipality may by ordinance, limit and restrict to specified districts
and may regulate therein, buildings and structures according to their construc-
tion, and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the
uses of land, and the exercise of such authority, subject to the provisions of
this article, shall be deemed to be within the police power of the State.
1977] MOBILE HOMES ZONING 1293
declared that the regulation of trailer camps was bound up with "the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare" of any municipality;2
accordingly, court sanction of any regulation of trailer homes-including
their outright prohibition-would follow almost as a matter of course.
The broad power thus accorded to local zoning authorities was attacked
in a heralded 29 dissent to Vickers, in which it was recognized that the
expansive view of the general welfare taken by the majority could em-
brace any conceivable zoning purpose30 and thus make it virtually im-
possible for any allegedly exclusionary ordinances to be attacked
successfully.31
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, thereafter delivered its
landmark opinion in Mount Laurel, signaling its determination to strike
down local ordinances that clearly resulted in exclusionary zoning. The
Mount Laurel court set- forth an elaborate and demanding definition
of the general welfare, specifically including an affirmative obligation
to provide the opportunity for "an appropriate variety and choice of
housing, for all categories of people." 2  Zoning regulations that in
any way restricted the availability of housing to favored groups would,
under this test, fail to promote the general welfare and thus be
an improper exercise of the zoning power. In addition, the Mount
Laurel decision defined the general welfare in terms of regions of the
state, rather than merely of the locality establishing the regulation.3
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan and de-
signed for one or more of the following purposes: to .... promote health,
morals, or the general welfare ....
Law of April 3, 1928, ch. 274, §§ 3, 5, 1928 N.J. Sess. Laws 696-97, as amended by
Law of Aug. 9, 1948, ch. 305, § 1, 1948 N.J. Sess. Laws 1221 (amending § 3; for-
merly codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-30 (West 1967)) & Law of July 31, 1964,
ch. 150, § 1, 1964 N.J. Sess. Laws 682 (amending § 5; formerly codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40:55-32 (West 1967)). The state zoning statutes subsequently underwent
major revision. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:55D-1 to -92 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
For the effect of this revision upon Weymouth, see note 81 and accompanying text infra.
28. 37 N.J. at 246, 181 A.2d at 136-37.
29. See, e.g., Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of
Northeastern New Jersey, in LAND UsE CONTROLS: PRESENT A FuTuRE REFORm 105,
125 (D. Listokin ed. 1974), in which Justice Hall's dissent is referred to as "by far the
best of modem zoning opinions."
30. 37 N.J. at 261, 181 A.2d at 145 (Hall, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 258-59, 181 A.2d at 143.
32. 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731. The basic test of the constitutionality of zon-
ing ordinances remains the same-if the ordinances are shown to promote the general
welfare, they constitute proper exercises of the zoning power and are therefore valid.
However, by defining with unusual specificity the meaning and requirements inherent
in the concept of the general welfare, the Mount Laurel court in effect required that
zoning ordinances meet a more rigorous standard in order to be considered as promoting
the general welfare.
33. Id. at 188-90, 336 A.2d at 732-33.
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By setting forth a comprehensively detailed definition of the general
welfare that was to be promoted by zoning ordinances, the Mount
Laurel court thus effectively restricted the scope of municipal land use
regulation-prohibiting zoning ordinances that restricted access to
the use of land on the basis of economic or racial factors.
This demanding standard of review necessitated the Weymouth
court's detailed demonstration of how the Weymouth ordinances pro-
moted the general welfare of both the municipality and the region, and
thus lay within the purview of the zoning power. Ironically, the Wey-
mouth court found that the very specific definition of the general
welfare provided a rationale for zoning ordinances permitting the
limited use of house trailers. In contrast, the Vickers court had held that
its view of the general welfare justified a total ban on the use of such
trailers in another municipality. In changing its views as to how the
use of trailer homes might alternatively impede or promote the general
welfare, the New Jersey court's decisions on the zoning of trailers may
seem inconsistent.3 4 But by adopting the view expressed in Mount
Laurel that "provision for adequate housing of all categories of people
is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare
required in all land use regulation,"' 5 the Weymouth court appears
to indicate that ordinances that expand housing opportunities, rather
than limit them, will hereafter find court approval.30
The court supported its conclusion that the Weymouth ordinances
promoted the general welfare by reviewing in considerable detail the
array of state and federal proclamations and programs illustrating gov-
ernmental determination to provide for the housing needs of the elderly
and thereby to promote their welfare and that of the political entity as
34. See 71 N.J. at 265, 364 A.2d at 1025, where the court declares: "In this re-
gard, the term [general welfare] is mutable and reflects current social conditions."
35. 67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727.
36. See 71 N.J. at 274-75, 364 A.2d at 1030. In this respect the Weymouth court
aligns itself with the ruling in Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369
N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), which upheld a zoning ordinance
creating a residential district providing, inter alia, for a Retirement Community District.
The Maldini court, finding the ordinance properly within the New York zoning statutes,
observed:
[The ordinance's] purpose-meeting the town's need for adequate housing for
the aged-was within the town's police powers to regulate land use for the pro-
motion of the community's health and general welfare ....
cial.Certainly, when a community is impelled . . . to move to correct so-
cial and historical patterns of housing deprivation, it is acting well within its
delegated 'general welfare' power.
Id. at 484-86, 330 N.E.2d at 405-06, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90.
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a whole. 7  The court cited these materials and various sociological
authorities to create a persuasive record justifying the use of trailer
homes as specifically permitted residences for the elderly, and, by
necessary implication, for all other income or age groups as well. 8
The court declared that ordinances of such benefit to the general wel-
fare would justify either a variance of, or reasonable exception to, the
municipality's general ban on trailer homes. 9 It then noted approv-
ingly that the ordinance would help satisfy the region's housing require-
37. 71 N.J. at 266-75, 364 A.2d at 1025-30. See such representative provisions
as: 12 U.S.C. § 1701h-1 (1970) (regarding the establishment of an "advisory com-
mittee on matters relating to housing for elderly persons"); id. § 1701r (in which Con-
gress declared: "Our older citizens face special problems in meeting their housing needs
because of the prevalence of modest and limited incomes among the elderly . . . and
their need for housing planned and designed to include features necessary to the safety
and convenience of the occupants in a suitable neighborhood environment."); id. §
1701z-6 (Supp. V 1975) (authorizing the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
to determine what housing is "most effective or appropriate to meet the needs of groups
with special housing needs including the elderly"); 42 id. § 1401 (1970) (declaring the
national policy "to make adequate provision . . . for families consisting of elderly per-
sons"); id. § 3012(a) (4) (Supp. V 1975) (establishing the function of the Administration
on Aging to "develop plans . . . and carry out programs designed to meet the needs of
older persons for social services, including . . . low-cost transportation and housing");
id. § 3028(a)(1) (providing for model projects to "assist in meeting the special
housing needs of older persons"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
78) (encouraging "senior citizen community housing construction consistent with provi-
sions permitting other residential uses of a similar density in the same zoning district");
id. § 52:27D-28.1 (stating that "senior citizens . . . need and deserve the attention, as-
sistance, and protection of the State"). In particular see id. § 55:14L-2, which estab-
lishes the creation of housing for the elderly as part of the state's policy to promote
the welfare of the state:
It is hereby found and declared . . . that the lack of properly constructed
rental housing units designed specifically to meet the needs of the elderly of
this state in the lower middle-income bracket at rentals which this class of el-
derly can afford constitutes a menace to the health, safety, welfare and morals
of the public ....
Id. This statute provides substantial support for the Weymouth holding that local zon-
ing regulations designed to encourage the provision of such housing satisfy the general
welfare requirement of the New Jersey zoning statutes.
38. See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
39. 71 N.J. at 278-80, 364 A.2d at 1032-33; see DeSimone v. Greater Englewood
Hous. Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 440, 267 A.2d 31, 37 (1970), in which the court up-
held a variance to a local zoning ordinance permitting a housing project for lower in-
come groups, declaring:
"Special reasons" is a flexible concept; broadly speaking, it may be defined by
the purposes of zoning set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:55-32, which specifically in-
clude promotion of "health, morals or the general welfare." . . . So variances
have been approved for many public and serfi-public uses because they signifi-
cantly further the general welfare.
For a decision providing even broader general welfare grounds justifying a variance for
a housing project for the elderly, see Borough of Roselle Park v. Township of Union,
113 N.J. Super. 87, 272 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). See also E. BARTLEY
& F. BAIR, MOBILE HOME PARKS AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNITY PLANNING 91
(1960), on the value of special exceptions in connection with the use of mobile homes,
although none of the special exceptions discussed therein are based on occupant age.
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ments for the elderly and thus would comport with the Mount Laurel
test.40 In this important aspect the Weymouth opinion differs sharply
from the holding reached in the analogous case of Hinman v. Planning
& Zoning Commission.41 In that case a zoning provision establishing
a housing development for the elderly was struck down by a Connecti-
cut court which insisted that the challenged ordinance was invalid in
not promoting the local general welfare." Other issues may have
guided the Hinman court to apply that line of reasoning;43 certainly the
approach of the Weymouth decision,"' focusing upon the relationship
of a challenged ordinance to the regional general welfare, is more ap-
propriate in zoning adjudication.45
Although zoning ordinances will inevitably affect people as well
as property, they are nonetheless designed as regulations upon the use
of land, not upon those who use it. The Weymouth ordinances, by re-
stricting the use of mobile homes on the basis of their occupants rather
than on the characteristics of the homes themselves, seem to disregard
that distinction. Opposition to ordinances such as the Weymouth provi-
sions has usually been based on this distinction," and one jurist has even
40. 71 N.J. at 275 n.9, 364 A.2d at 1030 n.9.
41. 26Conn. Supp. 125, 214A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965).
42. It is hard to conceive how there could be a need, in a town which is
chiefly rural, having a population of less than 5000 people, for a community
for aged people. . . . The welfare of aged people undoubtedly is a matter of
concern to the state and federal government, but it is not ordinarily a matter
of local governmental concern, and certainly not in towns the size of South-
bury.
Id. at 129, 214 A.2d at 133-34.
43. "[1It is obvious that the matter of enforcement of such a zoning regulation
would create problems of considerable magnitude. . . . [ihe proposed zoning amend-
ment appears to be designed to promote the financial interests of the petitioners for its
adoption rather than the public welfare . . . ." Id. at 130, 214 A.2d at 134; see 2 N.
WMLIAMS, supra note 2, § 50.16, for a general discussion of Hinman and the Connecti-
cut court's reasons for rejecting the proposed housing project and for thus relying on
such "a parochial view of the nature of the general welfare requirement underlying zon-
ing ...... Id. § 50.16, at 303.
44. Accord, Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385,
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975). The New York court observed, in regard to
the ordinance's purpose in meeting housing needs of the aged, that "[niot only was this
an important goal of the Town's Comprehensive Plan, but a matter of general public
concern not only to the locality but to the State and Nation as well." Id. at 485, 330
N.E.2d at 405-06, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (footnotes omitted).
45. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 20, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), in which the court declared:
"In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must
not ignore housing needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing
needs of its own population and of the region." (emphasis added).
46. See Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 128-29, 214
A.2d 131, 133 (C.P. 1965); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 261-62, 181 A.2d
129, 145 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233
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raised this doctrine to constitutional dimensions. 47  Recent commen-
tators have noted, however, that the distinction is illusory, for it ignores
the extent to which zoning ordinances, ostensibly regulating solely the
physical use of land, necessarily impinge upon the social and economic
well-being of those who are affected, however indirectly, by the use
of that land.48  As the Weymouth court correctly observed, "[A]s a con-
ceptual matter regulation of land use cannot be precisely dissociated
from regulation of land users."'49 In fact, if zoning ordinances are ever
to improve the general welfare to any substantial degree, such social
and economic factors must provide the express rationale for the
ordinances. 50 The New Jersey courts have recognized that zoning or-
dinances drafted to implement certain social planning goals may prop-
erly regulate land use. 5' Therefore the Weymouth ordinances, de-
signed to provide adequate and appropriate housing for certain age
groups of the community, are not invalid because they operate in terms
(1963); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 135 N.J. Super. 97,
99, 342 A.2d 853, 855 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005
(1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 380-81, 311 A.2d
187, 189 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976); Mal-
dini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 489, 330 N.E.2d 403, 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 393 (1975)
(Jasen, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Campbell v. Barraud, 88
Misc. 2d 97, 100-03, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383-86 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
47. Arguing that the ordinances challenged in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1973), violated the equal protection clause, Justice Marshall declared:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with the uses of land-with, for
example, the number and kind of dwellings to be constructed in a certain
neighborhood or the number of persons who can reside in those dwellings. But
zoning authorities cannot validly consider who those persons are, what they be-
lieve, or how they choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic
or Jew, Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.
Id. at 14-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
48. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, § 13.05, at 289, where the author declares:
Many issues which come up as land use decisions have substantial social and
economic implications: the obvious (but not the only) example is a decision
as between different types of housing. By now this is widely realized, and so
responsible public officials are likely to take such implications into account
It has long been settled in both law and widespread practice that towns
may take such considerations into account, at least to some extent.
49. 71 N.J. at 277, 364 A.2d at 1031.
50. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, § 1.11, at 22, quoted in Shepard v. Woodland
Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230,'248, 364 A.2d 1005, 1015-16 (1976).
See also 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, § 13.05, at 290:
[lit is more than a little surprising-and more than a little naive-for courts
in the 1970's to attempt to lay down a rule that land use controls may be used
only to regulate the physical pattern and physical interrelationships, and not
for any type of social or economic concerns.
51. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 247-
48, 364 A.2d at 1015-16. ("Permission to develop age homogeneous communities as a
possible use in a multifaceted community is a legislative judgment which should not be
disturbed by this Court unless clearly violative of constitutional principles.")
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of occupants' ages, rather than directly in terms of the tracts being
regulated.
Though classifications by occupant age may be properly within the
general regulatory ambit of zoning, the particular classifications chal-
lenged in Weymouth nonetheless appear to raise problems under the
equal protection provisions of both the state and federal constitutions.52
In general, judicial review of state regulations challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds is deferential53 and requires only a rational relationship
between the classifications under attack and a legitimate state objective
when the regulations neither impinge upon "fundamental interests" or
classify according to "suspect criteria."54 Although housing may be one
of "the most basic human needs,"5 it is nonetheless not deemed a "fun-
damental right" invoking strict scrutiny under the fourteenth amend-
ment.'6 Accordingly, the New Jersey court recognized that the Wey-
mouth ordinances are not subject to exhaustive equal protection review
52. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall. . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNs'r. amend.
XIV, § 1. See note 20 supra for the text of the equal protection provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution.
53. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), in which the Court
stated:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests ongrounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
54. For a general discussion of current Supreme Court application of equal protec-
tion review see Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). In addi-
tion, see Justice Marshall's attack on the current two-tier equal protection approach of
the Court in his dissent in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307(1976) (per curiam). In that case Marshall espoused a formally declared policy of
equal protection review that focuses "upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the govern-
mental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of
the classification." Id. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
55. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 178, 336 A.2d 713, 727 (1975); accord, Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township,
71 NJ. 249, 266, 364 A.2d 1016, 1025 (1976).
56. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Lindsey the Court rejected
the contention that the "need for decent shelter" was a fundamental interest requiring
strict scrutiny of any challenged regulation affecting that interest, declaring "[a]bsent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . is a legislative, not judi-
cial, function. . . ." Id. at 74. See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court observed that "the importance of a service per-
formed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 30.
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simply because they bear directly upon the housing needs of the par-
ties affected.57
In addition, the court noted that the challenged zoning ordinances
did not require strict scrutiny because they established classifications
based upon the age of prospective mobile home dwellers. The court
relied on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Massa-
chusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,5 holding that age was not a
suspect criterion under the fourteenth amendment. 59 It further ob-
served that even under the more demanding review required by state
standards the Weymouth ordinances need not be subjected to strict
scrutiny.60 As the Weymouth court noted, the ordinance does not bur-
den the elderly as the regulation challenged in Murgia allegedly did;61
rather the ordinance seeks to implement programs for their benefit,
much like numerous other governmental initiatives. 2 Governmental
provisions of a positive, affirmative nature-designed to open up hous-
ing opportunities to the elderly, rather than to deny them to individuals
not fulfilling the age specifications-are invariably spared rigorous
court review. 63  Therefore the decision of the Weymouth court not to
apply strict scrutiny to the zoning ordinances, and thus subject them to
likely invalidation, seems correct. Even if age is a suspect criterion
when used as the basis of governmental classifications, the resulting
discrimination in this case, as in others, favors, rather than handicaps,
the elderly.64
57. See 71 NJ. at 281, 364 A.2d at 1034.
58. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
59. 71 N.J. at 281-82, 364 A.2d at 1034 (citing 427 U.S. at 313-14).
60. Id. at 286-87, 364 A.2d at 1036-37; see note 20 supra.
61. 427 U.S. at 323-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See statutes cited in note 37 supra. See also Parrino v. Lindsay, 29 N.Y.2d
30, 35, 272 N.E.2d 67, 69-70, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (1971):
As bearing on the reasonableness of a classification based on age or income,
we but note the many laws which provide for public assistance, social security
payments, reduction in real estate taxes for elderly home owners and double
exemption on the computation of Federal, State and city income taxes and
other protective legislation based wholly on the age or economic need of the
recipient.
63. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973).
64. Even though dissenting in Murgia, Justice Marshall conceded that the elderly
do not suffer from discrimination to the same extent as such traditionally suspect classes
as Blacks, or such "quasi-suspect" classes as women or illegitimates. Indeed, 'The
elderly are protected not only by certain anti-discrimination legislation, but by legisla-
tion that provides them with positive benefits not enjoyed by the public at large. More-
over, the elderly are not isolated in society, and discrimination against them is not per-
vasive but is centered primarily in employment." 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). With respect to the field of housing it is significant to note that government
regulations banning discrimination in housing omit age as an improper basis for discrim-
ination, as if implicitly recognizing that the elderly are rarely, if ever, disfavored in the
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It could be argued that the age-oriented Weymouth ordinances do
infringe upon younger citizens' rights to use mobile homes within the
municipality. Since, however, Weymouth Township could have law-
fully denied such housing to any individual, regardless of age or
income,"5 a provision that operates to remove that prohibition even
partially does not further aggravate the mobile home housing needs of
those still subject to the township's general ban on mobile homes. In-
deed, allowing the elderly to occupy mobile homes may make more
traditional (if more costly) housing stock available to those who cannot
take advantage of the Weymouth ordinances.6
If the age of prospective occupants is permitted as a basis for the
Weymouth ordinances' classifications, then it follows that the adoption
of a particular age, fifty-two, as the cut-off for the regulations' operation
is valid unless proven to be arbitrary. Legislative line-drawing on the
basis of age is accorded a high degree of deference by the courts, 7
even when important needs such as food and shelter are at issue. 8
Under that generous standard of review it is evident that the fifty-two
year age limit set by the Weymouth ordinances should not be consid-
ered arbitrary. In fact, the permissive use of trailers for those over
age fifty-two actually relaxes the rigidity of the trailer prohibition more
than would the benchmarks established to define the "elderly" in other
housing market. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5309(a) (Supp. V 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
10:5-9.1, -12.f to .k (1976).
65. See Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. de-
nied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). See also text accompanying notes 24-
28 supra.
66. The same could be said of many of the government provisions cited in note
37 supra. Special efforts to house the elderly promote the accommodation of tile hous-
ing needs of all individuals, and to the extent the demand of the elderly is satisfied by
such government projects the overall demand for adequate housing is reduced, making
it easier for other groups to obtain housing on their own.
67. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In a separate opinion Justice
Stewart recognized that applying strict scrutiny to age limitations renders any given de-
marcation subject to invalidation. Referring to an Oregon provision setting the mini-
mum voting age at 21 years, Stewart declared: "Yet to test the power to estab-
lish an age qualification by the 'compelling interest' standard is really to deny a State
any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a 'compelling interest' in drawing
the line with respect to age at one point rather than another." Id. at 294-95. (Stewart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As was observed by another court, dis-
cussing Justice Stewart's opinion, "The power to establish an age requirement necessarily
involves the power to choose a reasonable one ... " Wurtzel v. Falcey, 69 N.J. 401,
404-05, 354 A.2d 617, 619 (1976) (per curiam).
68. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (while there is a "dra-
matically real factual difference" between cases involving business and industry and
those involving the "most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," that is
no basis for applying a different constitutional standard). See also notes 53-56 and ac-
companying text supra.
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statutes designed for their benefit."9 The persuasive record set forth
by the Weymouth court, supported by a learned social and economic
analysis, provides a rational basis for the fifty-two year threshold estab-
lished by the zoning ordinances;70 accordingly, the court was correct in
determining that the use of age classifications in general, and the cut-
off age limit of fifty-two years in particular, do not violate the principles
of equal protection. 71
Notwithstanding the Weymouth court's detailed review of the
issues discussed above, the court's most sedulous scrutiny was reserved
for an issue that was not even raised by plaintiff-the exclusionary
effect of the ordinances.72 The New Jersey Supreme Court strongly
69. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(4) (Supp. V 1975); id. § 1701s(c)(B)
(1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14L-3a (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), all of which provide
housing programs or loans for the elderly, defined therein as being persons 62 years
or older.
70. 71 N.J. at 284-85, 364 A.2d at 1035. But cf. Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc.
2d 97, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (invalidating a provision establishing a retire-
ment community for a New York municipality and limiting occupancy to individuals of
55 years or older). The court in Campbell found that limiting housing on the
basis of age, and particularly age 55, was unconstitutional, and conjured up "the
spectre of a completely stratified society . . . [in creating which] sociologists would do
well to study the rules and techniques of those other social creatures, the ants and the
bees." Id. at 104, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 387. This opinion, however, rests entirely on lower
court rulings in the Belle Terre, Woodland and Weymouth cases, all of which were sub-
sequently reversed on appeal. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 135 N.J. Super. 97, 342 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 71 N.J. 230,
364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayer's Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376,
311 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
71. The New Jersey court also rejected a due process attack on the Weymouth ordi-
nances, declaring that it constituted little more than a restatement of the equal protec-
tion challenge. 71 N.J. at 287-88, 364 A.2d at 1037. Under the doctrine set forth in
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the guarantee of due process requires only
that a law not be "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id.
at 525. The New Jersey court's careful study of the ordinance's relation to the general
welfare would seem to satisfy the latter requirement, and the court's well-reasoned rejec-
tion of the equal protection attack on the age classifications refutes any contention that
the 52 year cutoff provision is unreasonable or arbitrary.
For an analogous case also rejecting a due process attack on an ordinance granting
the elderly preferences with respect to housing, see Parrino v. Lindsay, 29 N.Y.2d 30,
35, 272 N.E.2d 67, 70, 323 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (1971). Parrino upheld a New York
City provision exempting the elderly from rent increases authorized under the city's rent
control provisions. Rejecting the contention that such an exemption amounted to depri-
vation of landlords' due process right to property (represented by the rent increases),
the court noted that if the original rent ceiling was valid (like the original ban on trailers
in Weymouth), a partial relaxation of its prohibitive effect, designed to benefit the el-
derly, did not further deprive the unexempted groups of any due process rights (whether
it be increased rent for landlords in Parrino, or access to mobile homes for the non-
elderly in Weymouth). Id. at 34-35, 272 N.E.2d at 69, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 691-92.
72. 71 N.J. at 288-96, 364 A.2d at 1037-41.
1302 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
condemned exclusionary zoning practices in Mount Laurel, specifically
noting that land use regulations creating a retirement community for
the elderly were part of the exclusionary package of zoning ordinances
there .7  Although the Weymouth ordinances are not as restrictive as
those condemned in Mount Laurel,74 they do display a potentially ex-
clusionary impact as pernicious as that discerned in the Mount Laurel
provisions. The New Jersey court engaged in an instructive review of
the factors that might have sufficed to establish the Weymouth ordinan-
ces as unlawfully exclusionary had this issue been properly brought
before it.
The court noted that housing for the elderly tends to provide net
tax benefits for municipalities, especially when income or age groups
with high demands for municipal services are thereby excluded.7
73. 67 N.J. at 169, 336 A.2d at 722. The Mount Laurel court further observed:
The extensive development requirements detailed in the ordinance make it ap-
parent that the scheme was not designed for, and would be beyond the means
of, low and moderate income retirees. The highly restricted nature of the zone
is found in the requirement that [with limited exceptions] all permanent resi-
dents must be at least 52 years of age ....
Id. The court disapproved of such land use regulations because "[a]ll this affirmative
action for the benefit of certain segments of the population is in sharp contrast to the
lack of action, and indeed hostility, with respect to affording any opportunity for decent
housing for the township's own poor living in substandard accommodations . . . ." Id.
74. The Weymouth ordinances were drafted for the purpose of "providing . . .
dwellings which the elderly who need housing can afford" and thus seem designed to
accommodate those low-income elderly excluded by the Mount Laurel ordinances. Tax-
payer's Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 381, 311 A.2d 187, 189-90
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). In addition, the Mount Laurel ordinances, unlike the
Weymouth provisions, placed an absolute limit on the number of children over 18'
who could reside with each "elderly" family in the retirement community established by
the ordinance. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 169, 336 A.2d 713, 722 (1975). Although the Weymouth provisions indirectly
limit the number of children by limiting the size of the mobile homes in which they
would dwell, the supreme court in Weymouth observed that this restriction alone does
not make the zoning ordinances exclusionary. 71 N.J. at 295 n.20, 364 A.2d at 1041
n.20. The New Jersey courts, however, had previously served notice that zoning ordi-
nances restricting housing to adults and excluding children would be struck down.
Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971).
75. 71 N.J. at 289-92, 364 A.2d at 1038-39. Communities for the elderly provide
favorable tax consequences because their demand for municipal services-in particular
for schooling-is far less than that of the population as a whole. Because the elderly
rarely have many children of school age residing with them, a community in which
many of the residents are of advanced age does not need to expend a considerable
amount of its revenue on education. As a result, the entire community's tax burden can
be maintained at relatively low levels. Municipal tax benefits of this nature are the
usual impetus behind exclusionary zoning ordinances and constitute an important reason
for their invalidity. For example, the Mount Laurel court declared "[t]here cannot be
the slightest doubt that the reason for this course of conduct has been to keep down
local taxes on property . . . ." 67 N.J. at 170, 336 A.2d at 723; see, e.g., Hinman v.
Planning & Zoning Comm., 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1975). See also
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Such tax motivations were present in the Weymouth situation, and the
court observed that the prevalence of such improper zoning purposes
had motivated the New Jersey legislature to promulgate new zoning
laws ensuring that municipally-§ponsored housing projects for the
elderly would be part of a balanced housing stock meeting the housing
needs of all individuals 6 -essentially the mandate of the New Jersey
court in Mount Laurel.77  As a result of these judicial and legislative
declarations, the Weymouth court established the basic test for assaying
the exclusionary impact of such ordinances: "If it substantially contri-
butes to an overall pattern of improper exclusion, the fact that the or-
dinance may also benefit the elderly is neither an excuse nor a justifi-
cation to sustain a challenge to a zoning provision. s7 8  Since there was
no evidence presented on this point, the Weymouth ordinances were
not examined under this principle, but its significance as a limit on the
ramifications of the Weymouth result is. not to be underestimated.79 It
is apparent that, after Weymouth, ordinances restricting land use on the
basis of age will be permitted only to the extent that they conform to
a comprehensive plan that meets the regional housing needs of all
groups within the region.80
Because of plaintiffs' failure to challenge the ordinances as unlaw-
fully exclusionary, the ultimate importance of this case may at first
appear to be limited. In one sense the entire result is moot, since the
Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971).
76. 71 NJ. at 288-92, 364 A.2d at 1037-39 (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
40:55D-62 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78)). In particular see N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55D-65.g (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), declaring that the contents of a zoning ordi-
nance must "[p]rovide for senior citizen community housing consistent with provisions
permitting other residential uses of a similar density in the same zoning district." See
also id. § 40:55D-21, which lists that requirement as one of the purposes of the state's
new Municipal Land Use Law.
77. 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
78. 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040 (footnote omitted).
79. As the court itself warns, "The Court's failure to probe more deeply into the
possible exclusionary effect of similar ordinances should not be understood to be the
product of blindness to their potentially exclusionary character, but only the consequence
of plaintiff's decision not to try the case on that legal theory' Id. at 295-96, 364 A.2d
at 1041.
80. See id. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040. It should be noted that the Weymouth court
did recognize and approve the inclusionary effect of the ordinances, id., since the quali-
fied use of mobile homes permitted by the regulation substantially reduces the exclusion-
ary impact of one of the zoning devices, the prohibition of mobile homes, that the Mount
Laurel court found "inherently exclusionary." 67 N.J. at 197, 202, 336 A.2d at 737,
740 (Pashman, J., concurring). However, as the test for exclusionary effect enunciated
by the Weymouth court implies, the indirect inclusionary effect of ordinances such as
the Weymouth provisions will not otherwise prevent their invalidation should they in-
directly operate to exclude other groups from a municipality.
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court declared that if the state's new zoning provisions were applicable
in Weymouth the challenged ordinances would not have been in com-
pliance.8' Viewed from another perspective, the Weymouth case
seems to be merely a repetition of the decision in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., which also set
forth avenues of attack to be employed against allegedly exclu-
sionary ordinances-but which nonetheless upheld the particular regu-
lations there under challenge by requiring that discriminatory intent be
proved to show a violation of the equal protection clause. 2  The Wey-
mouth decision, however, offers a far greater degree of guidance than
does Arlington Heights to future challengers of potentially exclusion-
ary zoning, since the New Jersey court's elaboration of the characteris-
tics and purposes indicative of improper exclusionary ordinances offers a
clearer and more detailed benchmark by which such ordinances may
be successfully discerned and defeated. In this respect the court's dis-
cussion of the Weymouth fact situation and its relationship to New Jer-
sey's new land use law88 completes the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Mount Laurel.84 In approving zoning ordinances restricting
land use on the basis of occupant age, the Weymouth court adds an
incisive ruling to those delivered by other jurisdictions affirming the
validity of such regulations. But by restricting the applicability of this
81. 71 N.J. at 296, 364 A.2d at 1041. The court declared that the new state provi-
sions require "that where a zoning ordinance establishes a district in which senior citizen
communities are a permitted use, the ordinance must also allow housing of similar den-
sity for some other residential use in the same district." Id. The Weymouth zoning
ordinances make no such provision for other residential uses, and in fact density require-
ments for other types of housing in the municipality are considerably higher. Id. at 296,
364 A.2d at 1041-42; cf. NJ. STAT. ANN. 40:55D-2(l), -65(g) (West Cum. Supp. 1977-
78) (encouraging senior citizen community housing, but requiring other residential uses
of a similar density in the same zoning district).
82. Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
made it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely be-
cause it results in a racially disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
. espondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that dis-
criminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision. This
conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court of Appeals' further
ruling that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is
without independent constitutional significance.
97 S. Ct. at 563, 566.
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-62 to -68 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
84. Although the Mount Laurel court had found that the provisions promoting a
retired adult community contributed to the exclusionary effect of the municipality's land
use regulations, the court specifically withheld passing "on the validity of any land use
regulation which restricts residence on the basis of occupant age." 67 N.J. at 169 n.7,
336 A.2d at 722 n.7.
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holding-by warning of the potentially exclusionary effect of such ordi-
nances-the Weymouth holding is made consonant with the Mount
Laurel guidelines and supplements the principles set forth in that
decision.
Perhaps more importantly, the Weymouth opinion illustrates the
increasing impact of federal and state housing and land use policy on
the heretofore far-ranging power of local zoning authorities.8" The
array of federal and state enactments cited by the New Jersey court
indicating governmental concern with the proper use of land on the one
hand, and the provision of proper accommodations for the elderly on
the other, illustrate the growing role legislative initative may come to
play in the struggle against exclusionary zoning and for adequate
housing.86 In particular, the Weymouth court's impressively substanti-
ated argument that the elderly's use of mobile homes promotes the
general welfare provides a strong basis for contending that all groups,
regardless of age or income, should be permitted to reside in mobile
homes. Since the primary purpose of zoning ordinances is to create
a better environment for all elements of the community, those reasons
(e.g., cost and convenience) that justify mobile homes for the elderly
would seem to justify their use by those individuals who do not meet
the age specifications of the Weymouth ordinances.8 7  The Weymouth
court's argument, strongly emphasizing the contribution to the general
welfare provided by trailer housing, if pressed further, could be used to
dismantle remaining regulatory barriers to the socially beneficial use
of mobile homes.8 8 In this respect the Weymouth decision may become
85. See Reilly, New Directions in Federal Land Use Legislation, in LAND USE
CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE REFORM 331, 333-40 (D. Listokin ed.
1974).
86. The Mount Laurel court's observation that "[c]ourts do not build housing nor
do municipalities" reflects the limited role which the courts or local governments are
obliged to play in regard to these issues. 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. As another
observer has remarked with respect to states asserting state or regional control over land
use planning and regulation, "The message here to municipalities should be clear
enough. Either modify prevailing local zoning philosophy and practices or lose author-
ity over local land use." Elias, Significant Developments and Trends in Zoning Liti-
gation, in LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND F TR REFORM 157, 159 (D.
Listokin ed. 1974).
87. This in essence was one of the objections raised by the lower court to the Wey-
mouth ordinances. Noting that the ordinances were adopted out of a concern with the
economic status of the elderly, the court declared: "But the same considerations which
allegedly motivated the adoption of the ordinances in this case are equally applicable
to young married couples or other individuals under the age of 52 years whose incomes
are low." 125 N.J. Super. at 382, 311 A.2d at 190.
88. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(1971), invalidating local zoning ordinances that in effect excluded mobile homes
from the municipality. The court found that
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significant, not merely as a coda to Mount Laurel, but in prefiguring
the reversal of Vickers and thus ending the New Jersey Supreme
Court's "blanket tolerance of prohibitions upon mobile homes."' 9 If
New Jersey, one of the relatively few jurisdictions allowing such
bans, 0 should thus abandon its position, it is possible that other states
that also uphold local bans on mobile homes 1 may follow its lead.
Should this be the case, then Weymouth may soon come to be viewed
as a dramatic step forward in the wider battle against exclusionary
zoning.
IRA STEVEN LEFTON
[c]ertain uses of land have come to be recognized as bearing a real, substan-
tial, and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety, and welfare so as
to be afforded a preferred or favored status. To restrict such uses appears to
conflict with the concept of presumed validity of an ordinance prohibiting such
an otherwise legitimate use.
Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324. The court then observed that "[i]egislative enactments
geared toward a betterment of the general welfare will, in the appropriate factual setting,
give rise to a legally protected land use, thereby negating the operation of the presump-
tion of validity which normally surrounds local legislative restrictions." Id. at 215, 192
N.W.2d at 326. Once such a protected land use has been defined, regulations restricting
its accessability bear a high risk of invalidation:
Since mobile home parks have, by virtue of state statute coupled with judi-
cial precedent, been afforded a protected status, there is no longer a presump-
tion of validity of an ordinance which operates toward their exclusion. Such
protection of this particular land use is of increased importance in view of the
massive nationwide housing shortage which necessitates a re-defining of the
term "general welfare" as applied to justify residential zoning.
Id. at 217, 192 N.W.2d at 328. A similar conflict between policies founded in statutes
that regulate and license certain land-use activities and those policies, also founded in
statutes, that encourage such uses as being in the public interest, is discussed in general
and with particular application to New Jersey in Feiler, Metropolitizaton and Land-Use
Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655, 694-95 (1971).
89. 71 N.J. at 279 n.14, 364 A.2d at 1032 n.14. The court specifically avoids
reaching this issue in Weymouth-but in doing so lists those reasons upon which reversal
of Vickers could be based. Id.
90. The majority of states ruling on this issue have held such bans invalid. E.
BARTLEY & F. BArn, supra note 39, at 79; Moore, The Mobile Home and the Law, 6
AKRor L. REV. 1, 7 (1973).
91. North Carolina is among those jurisdictions. See City of Raleigh v. Morand,
247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 343 (1958) (an ordi-
nance prohibiting trailer camps from being established in residentially-zoned areas in the
city and within one mile of its corporate limits was a valid exercise of the police power).
